












THE IMPACT OF LABELING PRACTICES ON PERCEIVED 
QUALITY OF GM FOOD PRODUCTS:  
A REVEALED PREFERENCES APPROACH      
Sara Scatasta
1, Justus Wesseler
1 and Jill Hobbs
2 
1Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Department of Social Sciences 
Wageningen University, The Netherlands 





Paper prepared for presentation at the 11th Congress of the EAAE  
(European Association of Agricultural Economists),  
The Future of Rural Europe in the Global Agri-Food System, Copenhagen, Denmark, 
August 24-27, 2005      
Copyright 2005 by Sara Scatasta, Justus Wesseler and Jill Hobbs.  All rights reserved.  Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 




THE IMPACT OF LABELING PRACTICES ON PERCEIVED 
QUALITY OF GM FOOD PRODUCTS:  
A REVEALED PREFERENCES APPROACH  
Sara Scatasta
1, Justus Wesseler
1 and Jill Hobbs
2  
1Environmental  Economics  and  Natural  Resources  Group,  Department  of  Social  Sciences 
Wageningen University, The Netherlands 
2 Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan, Canada  
Abstract  
This article contributes to the ongoing discussion about the impact of different labeling practices on 
the quality of genetically modified (GM) food products as perceived by the consumer. Thus far, many 
studies have adopted a stated preferences approach, finding that consumers have different willingness 
to pay for GM and non-GM products. This article offers an empirically tractable theoretical model that 
can be used easily to investigate the impact of GM labeling practices on the perceived quality of GM 
food products, making use of market data.    
Keywords: Consumer preferences, genetically modified food products, labeling, quality, variety, 
elasticity of substitution. 




1. Introduction  
Agricultural biotechnology has introduced a new quality dimension into consumer markets for 
food.  Foods  derived  from  genetically  engineered  plants  or  animals  (hereafter  referred  to  as 
genetically modified (GM) foods ), have been controversial. The initial biotechnology innovations 
were primarily  focused on agronomic improvements to crops. These innovations were targeted at 
specific  weed  or  pest  problems,  allowing  reduced  use  of  chemical  herbicides  and  pesticides;  for 
example, herbicide-tolerant canola or pest-resistant soybeans. Two classes of benefits flowed from 
these products. First, direct benefits to the grower in terms of reduced reliance on chemical inputs and 
reduced  managerial  costs  through  less  time  spent  spraying  for  weeds  or  pests.  Second,  potential 
environmental externality benefits from the reduced use of chemical inputs. However, there has been a 
well-documented consumer backlash against the technology, with consumer concerns ranging from 
long-run food safety concerns, the potential environmental impacts of GM crops, and ethical concerns 
over  the  nature  of  the  technology  (Hobbs  and  Kerr,  2003).  Consumers  with  strong  negative 
perceptions are likely to view food derived from GM ingredients as inferior to non-GM food.   
Policymakers have been faced with the conundrum of how to handle diverse consumer preferences 
towards GM technology in an environment of uncertainty. As a result, different labeling policies have 
emerged. The European Union (EU) requires mandatory labeling of food containing more than 0.9% 
GM content
1, while the US instead has rules for voluntary labeling of non-GM food. Adding to the 
complexity of this issue is the promise of future biotechnology innovations that could produce GM 
food with direct positive health attributes (so-called  functional foods ) or GM innovations with direct 
environmental benefits.  
Consumer perceptions of GM food quality, the divergence in GM labeling policies, and the likely 
consumer  response  to  different  types  of  GM/Non-GM  labels  have  become  important  topics  for 
policymakers  and  have  generated  a  plethora  of  research  studies.  Several  studies  have  provided  a 
qualitative analysis  of the impact of different labeling practices on the quality of GM food products as 
perceived  by  the  consumer  (see  for  example  Hobbs  and  Kerr,  2003,  Crespi  and  Marette,  2003, 
Caswell, 1998 and 2000, Stul, 2000, Phillips and Isaac, 1998). Empirically, many studies have adopted 
the stated preferences approach (SPA), finding that consumers have a positive willingness to pay 
(WTP) for non-GM food products over GM food. 
In a US-based study, Chen and Chern (2004), find that the mean WTPs to avoid GM foods is 5% 
for GM vegetable oil, and 28% for GM salmon. Similarly, Kaneko and Chern, 2003, find that the 
mean WTP to avoid GM foods in the U.S. is, respectively, 41.2%, 31.4%, 40.9%, and 52.5% of the 
base price for GM vegetable oil, GM cornflake cereal, GM-fed salmon, and GM salmon, despite the 
presence of (unlabeled) GM food products in the market.  In Norway, they estimate the mean WTP to 
avoid GM foods   as 54% and 67%, respectively, of the base price for GM-fed salmon, and GM 
salmon. Boccaletti and Moro (2000), in a local survey find that consumers in Piacenza (Italy) are 
willing to pay a premium between 6% and 10% of the regular price for products with lower pesticide 
use and enhanced nutritional properties, suggesting a positive attitude towards GM products with these 
attributes. 
Stated preference analyses have been heavily criticized   due to potential shortcomings with the 
associated contingent valuation methodology (Carson et al., 2001). Noussair et al. (2002) note that 
there is usually a large difference between stated and revealed purchasing behavior. Yet there is a lack 
of empirical studies adopting a revealed preference approach (RPA) for GM labeled food products. 
Empirical RPA analysis has been constrained by the lack of market data for food identified as GM. 
Despite the criticisms, if the results of the SPA studies are correct we would expect a positive WTP for 
non-GM food products in RPA studies. Comparing results from SPA studies with those from RPA 
studies,  therefore,  could  be  useful  in  drawing  conclusions  about  the  robustness  of  SPA  findings. 
Results from RPA studies, valuing impacts on use-values, would also offer a lower bound estimate of 
the social welfare impacts of GM labels. 
This paper develops an empirically tractable theoretical model, based on a RPA and employing 
market  data,  that  can  be  easily  used  to  investigate  the  impact  of  GM  labeling  practices  on  the 
perceived  quality  of  GM  food  products.  The  model  explicitly  incorporates  the  complexities  of 
                                                          
 




horizontal  and  vertical  quality  differentiation  that  characterize  food  markets  in  a  world  with  GM 
technology.   The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  in  section  2  we  present  a  theoretical  model  of 
consumer demand with vertical and horizontal quality differentiation;  insection 3 we show how the 
model works through simulated scenarios for soymilk; in section 4 we summarize our main findings 
and conclusions.    
2. Theoretical model: Consumer Demand with Quality Differentiation   
The results from SPA studies discussed in the previous section suggest that being GM introduces  
a  new  element  of  differentiation  among  crops  and  crop  products  as  perceived  by  the  consumer. 
Product  differentiation  is  not  a  new  concept  in  economic  theory.  Products  may  be  differentiated 
horizontally through variety (as suggested by Hotelling, 1929; Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) 
and vertically through quality (as suggested by Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 
1982). 
Degryse (1996) defines products to be horizontally differentiated when there is no consensus of 
ranking among consumers, and vertically differentiated when there is such a ranking at equal prices. 
Products  that  are  present  in  the  market  in  different  flavors,  for  example,  will  be  differentiated 
horizontally (Baker, 1997). Products with different levels of environmental friendliness, for example, 
will be differentiated vertically (Lutz et al. 1998). 
Horizontal and vertical differentiation are not mutually exclusive. In fact, products   are usually 
characterized by several attributes and each attribute may become an element of horizontal or vertical 
differentiation depending on the structure of consumer preferences (Economides, 1989; Neven and 
Thisse; 1990, Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991; Anderson et al., 1992; Tabuchi, 1994). 
For  the  case  of  GM  crops  and  crop  products,  soymilk  provides  a  useful  illustration.   The 
introduction of a soy milk product labeled as  not containing GMOs  might affect, either positively or 
negatively, the perceived environmental friendliness of the product and induce vertical differentiation. 
In fact, the direction of impacts of GM labeling on demand is an empirical question. Only if GM 
labeling  is  effective  in  changing  consumer  perceptions  of  product  quality  attributes,  such  as  the 
environmental friendliness of labeled  non-GM soymilk, will there be an  impact on  the degree of 
vertical  differentiation  in  the  market  for  soymilk.  It  is  the  degree  of  perceived  environmental 
friendliness of a product that drives vertical differentiation and not the presence of the label alone.  
The introduction of a new soymilk flavor such as strawberry, would instead impact the degree of 
horizontal differentiation. 
In the context of GM labeling issues, therefore, it seems reasonable to impose a structure on 
consumer preferences that recognizes both aspects of product differentiation: horizontal and vertical. 
Helpman and Krugman (1996) suggest the use of a constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) two-
level utility function to represent consumer preferences when products are horizontally differentiated:   
,..., ,..., 1 i I U U u u u
 
(1)  
where  i u is the sub-utility derived by consumers from product  i , with  ,.., i 1 I ; and  U is the 
overall  utility  function  that  translates  all  sub-utilities  in  an  aggregated  welfare  level.  Following 
Helpman  and  Krugman  (1996)  we  assume  that  the  utility  function  in  Eq.  (1)  is  increasing  and 
homothetic in its arguments. 














where  i D is  the  consumed  quantity  of  variety 
 
of  product  i  with  ,..., i 1 N ;  and  iis  the 
elasticity of substitution between any pair of product varieties in sector i. As noted by Helpman and 
Krugman,  it  is  reasonable  to  consider  varieties  of  the  same  products  as  substitutes  rather  then 
complements.  This  implies  that  the  elasticity  of  substitution  i
 
is  larger  than  one,  and  captures 
consumer preferences for horizontal product differentiation through variety.  
In order to capture consumer preferences for vertical differentiation through quality we introduce 











The above preference structure is a standard constant elasticity of substitution utility function 
where 
1 i i
i represents what is usually interpreted in the literature as  weights . We give this 
expression a more precise economic interpretation, and argue that  i captures consumer preferences 
for quality by vertical product differentiation and hence, is a  quality weight . 
To understand our line of reasoning let us consider the Marshallian demand function associated 















for every  , 1,..., i j N . In Eq. (4),  i E  is the expenditure allocated by the consumer to product i. 





for every  , 1,..., i j N .   These assumptions, together with the demand function in 










From Eq. (5) we derive consumers  willingness to pay ( )
i N 1 WTP for one additional variety 



















In  Eq.  (6)  for  i
 
we  observe  that  0
i N 1 WTP .  This  shows  that  as  the  elasticity  of 
substitution increases, consumers  willingness to pay to have more varieties of product i in the market 
decreases. In this sense the elasticity of substitution  i
 
is related to consumers  strength of preference 
for variety and it will determine, at the equilibrium, the degree of horizontal product differentiation
2 . 
                                                          
 




Analogously we derive consumers  willingness to pay  1 0 ( )
i i WTP
 
for an increase in the value of 











In Eq. (7)  1 0
i i WTP
 




and independent of the number of varieties in the 
market, showing that the parameter  i captures product characteristics that affect consumer welfare 
independently of the number of varieties in the market. These characteristics may be equal across 
varieties  and  still  be  important  to  consumers.  Our  interpretation  is  that  parameter  i captures 
consumer preferences for product quality. For example, chocolate soymilk and vanilla soymilk may 
have the same degree of environmental friendliness and it is reasonable to think that the higher is this 
degree of environmental friendliness, at equal prices, the better off the consumer will be. 
It  should  be  noticed  that,  if  quality  varies  across  varieties,  the  two  dimensions  of  horizontal 
differentiation and vertical differentiation will interact with each other. Relaxing the assumption that 
quality is equal across varieties, we obtain the following indirect utility function:   
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From Eq. (8) we derive the willingness to pay  1 0 ( )
ij ij WTP for an increase in product quality,  ij , 
of an existing variety  , i j 1 N :   
1 0
1
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 0 0
( 1) ( 1) 1 1
1
i i i













and shows, for example, that the impact 
on consumer welfare of an increase in the degree of perceived environmental friendliness of chocolate 
soymilk will depend not only on the degree of perceived environmental friendliness but also on how 
much the consumer cares about consuming both flavors: chocolate and vanilla. If prices vary across 
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The willingness to pay in (9b) is non negative if the increase in quality causes no change or a 
reduction  in  the  quality-adjusted  prices, 
1 1 0 0
ij ij ij ij p p and
1 0 0 0
i i i i p p .
3  This  is 
reasonable to expect under monopolistic competition for the supply of varieties of product i.
4 
The  willingness  to  pay  in  Eq.  (9b)  can  be  estimated  empirically  using  the  following  relative 










Taking the logarithm of Eq. (10) we obtain the following empirically estimable log-linear demand 

















allow  us  to 
compute the ratio of product qualities as perceived by the consumer:  exp 1 ik il ik i . If 
1 ik il then variety ik has the same perceived quality of variety il.  If    1 ik il
 
then variety 
ik is perceived to have a better quality than variety il, and vice versa. 
To understand how this empirical specification can be used to investigate the impact of GM labels 
on consumer welfare via revealed preferences, consider  again the case of soymilk (i=s). Suppose we 
have market data on sales of soymilk without a label (0), market data on sales of soymilk with a label 
indicating  non-GM  (1), and the following flavors: chocolate (c), original (o), and vanilla (v).  The 
impact of the introduction of soymilk produced from GM soybeans can be inferred from the impact of 
the  non-GM  label on the perceived quality of labeled products relative to products without a label. 
Such impact can be found by estimating the following system of relative demand functions: 
                                                          
 
3 Note that this specification of the WTP assumes that product category i is perfectly substitutable with 
products  in  categories  other  than  i,  or  that  quality  improvements  in  product  category  i  lead  to 
negligible changes in the budget allocation decisions of consumers across product categories. The 
latter is more likely to occur when consumer expenditure for product category i represents a small 
share of total income, as  would be the case for soymilk. 


























































































In Eq. (12) we arbitrarily choose original-flavored   soymilk without a label to be a numeraire 
variety. This choice does not affect our results. From estimation of Eq. (12) we can compute quality 
ratios for each flavor with the  non-GM  label with respect to its counterpart without the GM label: 
1 0
ik il .  Consumer  willingness  to  pay  for  consumption  of  soymilk  labeled  non-GM  can  be 
computed as:   
1 0
1
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 1 1 1




i i i i
i i i s s
so sc sv
so so so sc so sv
s
so sc sv







In general, if only one variety with a  non-GM  label is introduced:   
1 0
1
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
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1 1 1 1 0
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From Eq. (13) it can be seen that the choice of the numeraire variety has no effect on consumer 
welfare impact estimates. The specification in Eq. (12) can be easily extended to include additional 
types  of  labeling  such  as  organic ,  or  may  contain  GMOs ,  and  additional  flavors  such  as 
strawberry.  
Thus, the empirical model proposed in this paper allows for a detailed empirical investigation of 
regulatory issues related to particular product categories. This analysis would be more difficult in a 
system of demand equations such as the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) proposed by Deaton 
and Mullbauer (1980), where demand functions are specified to explain consumer expenditure for 



















we notice that if (non-)GM labels have an effect on the perceived quality of (non-)GM foods, and 
prices  adjust  to  maintain  relative  quality-adjusted  prices  at  the  same  level  they  were  before  the 
introduction of the label, there will be no effect on consumer expenditure for affected products. Yet 
the absolute value of quality-adjusted prices might have an impact on consumer welfare, as shown by 
the utility function specified in Eq. (3). An AIDS system, therefore, could fail to capture the full extent 
of  consumer  welfare  impacts  related  to  the  introduction  of  GM  labels.  The  role  of  consumer 
perceptions of quality, consumer preferences for variety and the interaction of these two factors is 
examined with a simulation analysis in the next section.  
3. The case of soymilk: some simulated scenarios  
Soymilk provides an interesting illustration of our model as the product can be differentiated on a 
number of attributes, including protein content, flavour, GM content, organic content, etc. Soymilk is 
produced from ground soybeans and water. The protein content of soymilk depends on the protein 
content of the soybeans used in the production process, as well as the equipment used to keep the soy 
protein from denaturizing during the extraction phase (Prosoya , 2004). 
Soymilk drinks are present in the U.S. market in a variety of different flavors. Flavor quality is 
independent of the soybean variety used. However, some soymilk manufacturers prefer the use of 
certified organic soybeans which, by definition, are  not genetically modified. Terms such as  GMO-
free  and  Non-GMO  on food labels, although used until recently, are no longer recognized by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Thus, an  organic  label is to some extent a proxy for a  non-GM 
claim.  Soymilk producers have the option to use one of the following labels:  100% organic  requires 
ingredients to be 100% organic;  organic  requires ingredients to be at least 95% organic;  made with 
organic ingredients  requires ingredients to be at least 70% organic; alternatively, organic ingredients 
can be listed in the ingredients panel without claiming the final product is organic. A red heart may be 
printed on the package if the product contains at least 6.25 grams of soy proteins in 8 fluid ounces 
(0.24 Liters).  
As a result, branded trademarks are present in the soymilk market, with a different set of flavors, 
protein  contents,  and  labels.
5  Silk
 
soymilk,  for  example,  is  present  in  the  U.S.  market  in  the 
following flavors: Original, Vanilla, Chocolate, Enhanced, Unsweetened, Coffee, Mocha, Nog. The 
protein content varies by flavor, for example: 5 grams for chocolate; 6.25 grams for vanilla; and 7 
grams for plain in an 8 ounce serving. The package carries a label stating  This soymilk is made from 
soybeans that were not genetically engineered . The  organic  label Silk
 
chocolate soymilk is the 
best selling chocolate soymilk in the market, with a suggested retail price of about $ 1.74 per liter 
(Silk , 2004). 
Edensoy  soymilk is another U.S. brand, with the following flavors: Original, Vanilla, Chocolate, 
Unsweetened, Carob (chocolate-like but unsweetened). The protein content in an 8 ounce serving  is: 8 
grams for chocolate; 7 grams for vanilla; and 11 grams for original.. The package carries the  organic 
label and the red heart logo. Edensoy chocolate soymilk has a suggested retail price of about $ 2.09 
per liter (Edensoy , 2004). 
Vita Soy  is also an important branded soymilk in the U.S. The range of flavors include: Original, 
Vanilla, Chocolate, Enhanced and Green Tea.  The protein content for an 8 ounce serving is  7 grams 
for the chocolate vanilla and original flavors. 
6  Vita Soy
 
uses at least 70% organic soybeans and 
carries the label  made with organic soy  and the red heart logo. Vita Soy
 
is also committed to use 
                                                          
 
5 Other factors may vary, such as packaging. 
6 Soymilk in the  light  product line has lower protein content than that of other product lines.   
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only  soybeans  that  are  not  genetically  modified,  following  the  0.9%  threshold  set  by  European 
Standards but the package does not carry a specific label in this regard(Vitasoy , 2004).  
This short description indicates that consumer choices for soymilk are likely to be influenced by a 
variety of factors, including the type and number of flavors and the perceived quality of each flavor. 
Quality  perceptions,  in  turn,    are  influenced  by  the  protein  content,  the  percentage  of  organic 
ingredients, the presence of a red heart on the package, and the presence of an explicit label stating the 
absence of GMOs. In our specific case, among the three brands taken into consideration only Silk
 
offers  explicit  GM(-free)  labeling,  while  the  highest  protein  content  can  be  found  in  Edensoy . 
(Silk , 2004; Eden Foods, 2004; Vita Soy , 2004; and Sunrich Food Group, 2004). 
The consumer preference structure presented in section 2 can be used to model these particular 
product  attributes  and  to  identify  the  two  drivers  of  consumer  purchasing  behavior:  consumers 
preferences for choice/variety and consumers  preferences for quality. In our simulated scenarios we 
take into consideration three soymilk flavors: Chocolate, Vanilla and Original. We present 4 different 
cases to answer the following three questions. 
First question: is it possible that the introduction of a label identifying the lower quality product 
may impact consumer welfare differently than a label identifying the higher quality product? 
Second  question:  under  what  conditions  will  the  introduction  of  a  label  identifying  GM-free 
soymilk have the greatest positive impact on consumer welfare? 
Third question: How do consumers  perceptions of quality and consumers  interest in   variety 
shape  the  effects  of  GM  labeling  on  consumer  welfare,  and  do  we  need  information  on  both 
dimensions of consumer preferences? 
To proceed we analyze four cases. In case 1, consumers have a high degree of interest in (strong 
preferences  for)   variety  ( i =2),  and  for  each  flavor  they  have  the  option  of  choosing  between 
products  carrying  the  label:  This  soymilk  is  made  from  soybeans  that  were  not  genetically 
engineered , and products that do not carry such a label. In case 2, consumers have a low degree of 
interest in (are indifferent towards or have only weak preferences for)  variety ( i =100), and for each 
flavor they have the option of choosing between products carrying the label:  This soymilk is made 
from soybeans that were not genetically engineered , and products that do not carry such a label. In 
case 3, consumers have a high degree of interest in (strong preferences for) variety ( i =2). However, 
only for chocolate soymilk do they have the option of choosing between products carrying the label: 
This soymilk is made from soybeans that were not genetically engineered , and products that do not 
carry such a label. In case 4, consumers have a low degree of interest in (are indifferent towards or 
hold only weak preferences for)   variety ( i =100). Similar to case 3, they only have the option of 
choosing between products carrying the label:  This soymilk is made from soybeans that were not 
genetically engineered , and products that do not carry such a label for the chocolate soymilk. 
For each case we set the quality of the product carrying no label as the numeraire and consider 
four alternatives with respect to relative product quality in the context of genetic modification. We 
assume prices to be the same across products and equal to $1.80 per liter of soymilk. We also assume 
protein content to be the same across products. The expenditure for soymilk in the U.S. in 2001 was 
about $500 million. Given that only 11% of the U.S. population of about 293 million individuals 
purchased soymilk in 2001, we assume an allocated per capita yearly expenditure for soymilk of $16 
such that  16 i E  (Sunrich Food Group, 2004). 




7 The initial quality parameter 
0,1
s may vary between 0 
and  infinity, but we arbitrarily set 
0 1 s for every flavor. We let 
1




represents a situation where consumers perceive GM products to be much better 
than GM-free products (Alternative A); 
                                                          
 
7 The effect of different protein contents, as well as the presence of the organic label and the red heart 
logo could be investigated by further disaggregating product categories to pinpoint those differences, 






represents  a  situation  where  consumers  perceive  GM  products  to  have  the  same 




represents a situation where consumers perceive GM-free products to be slightly 




represents a situation where consumers perceive GM-free products to be much 
better than GM products (Alternative D).  
This distinction yields the four different values of the quality ratio in column 2. In columns 3 and 
4 we use equation Eq. (4) to compute purchased quantities of GM-free chocolate soymilk and GM 
chocolate soymilk to show within-flavor differences. These differences will be equal across varieties 
in case 1 and case 2. In column five we show percentage change in GM market share, which is 
computed relative to the market share of GM products when there is no difference in perceived quality 
(16.67% in all four cases).  
In column 6 we compute consumer willingness to pay for GM-free products using equation Eq. 
(13),  and  in  column  7  the  percentage  change  in  consumer  welfare  due  to  the  GM-free  label  is 
computed relative to consumer welfare when there is no difference in perceived quality (53.33 utils in 
case 1 and case 3; 9.05 utils in case 2 and case 4).
8  
Table 1   Case 1: High interest in (strong preferences for) variety,  i =2, label on all GM-free 
products.  
























































B: GM equal 












































                                                          
 
8 The percentage change in consumer welfare is computed with respect to consumer utility after 
labeling, 
1 u , and consumer utility before labeling ,
0 u , as 
1 0 0 / u u u . Note that since C.E.S. utility 
functions are separable in income the following holds: 
1 0 1 / i WTP E u u u .  
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Table 2   Case 2: Low interest in (weak preferences for) variety,  i=100, label on all 
GM-free products. 
























































B: GM equal 












































Table 3   Case 3: High care interest in (strong preferences for) variety,  i=2, label only on 
chocolate GM-free products.  
























































B: GM equal 
















































Table 4   Case 4: Low interest in (weak preferences for)  variety,  i =100, label only on 
chocolate GM-free products.  























































B: GM equal 












































The simulation results can help answer the three questions we posed related to the GM labeling 
debate.  
To answer the first question: Is it possible that the introduction of a label identifying the lower 
quality product may impact consumer welfare differently than a label identifying the higher quality 
product?, compare in each table the results for Alternative A, column 7 with results for Alternative D, 
column 7. For example, in case 1, when consumers perceive GM products to be of better quality than 
GM-free products (Alternative A), introducing a label identifying GM-free products yields a reduction 
in consumer welfare of about 49.50% (Alternative A, column 7). Instead, if consumers perceive GM-
free products to be much better than GM products (Alternative D) and a label is introduced to identify 
GM-free products, consumer welfare increases 49.5 times (4950%) its original value (Alternative D, 
column 7).  An analogous case can be derived for the introduction of a label identifying GM products. 
The rationale behind this result is that consumer perceptions of product quality may not be an 
absolute concept but instead are relative to the perceived quality of a close substitute present in the 
market and serving as the  numeraire . When market conditions change due to the introduction of a 
label,  only  the  perceived  quality  of  labeled  products  changes  in  the  direction  given  by  consumer 
preferences, relative to the close substitute chosen by consumers as the numeraire.
9 Thus, a label that 
allows consumers to choose with certainty the product that they prefer results in higher welfare gains 
than a label that identifies only the lower quality product, and leaves some uncertainty as to the true 
quality of unlabelled substitutes.  
The second question: Under what conditions will the introduction of a label identifying GM-free 
soymilk have the greatest positive impact on consumer welfare?, can be answered by comparing by 
comparing results in column 7 of each table. The greatest positive impacts on consumer welfare are 
found in case 2 and case 4. In both cases consumer welfare increases by almost 10 times. Thus the 
introduction of a label identifying GM-free products has the greatest positive impact on consumer 
welfare when consumers have little interest in product variety and perceive GM-free products to be of 
much higher quality (case 2, alternative D). For the same difference in perceived quality we find the 
lowest percent change in consumer welfare when consumers care about variety but only the chocolate 
soymilk is available in the GM-free option (case 3, alternative D, column 7 shows that consumer 
welfare becomes 16.5 times higher). We also note that changes observed in consumer expenditure 
                                                          
 
9 A negative willingness to pay would actually require a compensation for the introduction of the 
product.   
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within flavors cannot be identified by simply looking at the total per capita expenditure for soymilk, 
which in all cases does not vary and is always equal to $16. 
Comparing the results in column 4 in cases 1 and 3 helps to answer the third question:
 
How do 
consumers  perceptions of quality and consumers  interest in variety shape the effects of GM labeling 
on consumer welfare, and do we need information on both dimensions of consumer preferences? If 
consumers care about variety, even if GM-free products are perceived to be of better quality than GM 
products,  there  will  always  be  some  quantity  purchased  of  GM  products.  In  case  1,  the  quantity 
purchased of GM chocolate soymilk will be between 0.03 and 2.93 liters depending on how much 
better  GM-free  products  are  perceived  to  be.  In  case  3,  the  quantity  purchased  of  GM  chocolate 
soymilk will be even higher (where GM-free is preferred) depending on how much better GM-free 
products are perceived to be. Instead, if consumers do not care about variety, the market share of GM 
products can fall to zero, as shown in column 4 of cases 2 and  4. A comparison of values in column 5 
within each table shows that whether GM producers suffer a loss, or enjoy a gain, in market share 
depends on consumers  perceived quality of GM products relative to GM-free products. A comparison 
of values in column 5 across tables shows that the size of the gain or loss in market share depends on 
the degree to which consumers care about variety.  Strong preferences for variety mitigate the loss in 
market share for GM products when consumers prefer GM-free over GM. 
Consumers  perceptions  of  quality  and  consumers  level  of  interest  in  variety  may  work  in 
opposite directions in shaping the impact of GM labeling on the market share of GM products. This 
interaction is particularly important for small changes in perceived quality. If GM-free products are 
perceived to be slightly better than GM products, the loss in market share for GM producers will be at 
most 33.3% (case 1, alternative C, column 5) if consumers care about variety. If consumers do not 
care about variety, GM producers will loose all of their market share (case 2 and case 4, alternative C, 
column5). 
This suggests that knowing ex-ante consumers  perceptions of the quality of GM-free products 
relative to GM products through contingent valuation studies, and a measure of consumers  interest in 
having  variety  in  a  specific  market,  may  help  regulators  to  forecast  impacts  of  different  labeling 
schemes  on  producer  welfare.  Another  way  of  thinking  about  this  result  is  that  if  consumersare 
interested in variety, producers of GM products may reduce losses from the introduction of a GM-
label by introducing new flavors in the market that are not available as GM-free.   
4. Discussion and Conclusion   
In this paper we introduced a theoretically-consistent empirical model that allows researchers to 
include two basic dimensions of consumer preferences in  an empirical analysis (ex-ante as well as ex-
post) of regulatory issues such as GM labeling. The first dimension, consumer perceptions of quality, 
determines the direction of the impacts of the introduction of GM labels on producer and consumer 
welfare. The second dimension, consumer interest in (preferences for) variety, will determine the size 
of those impacts. Using soymilk as an illustrative example we are able to show that positive and 
negative labeling can have different impacts on consumer welfare. In this context, the decision of the 
US Food and Drug Administration to reject mandatory labeling of GM products in favor of voluntary 
labeling of GM-free products appears to be supported by the predictions of the theoretical model.  
Further  analysis  of  the  US  food  markets  affected  by  this  regulatory  decision,  and  consumer 
preferences in those markets, would be required to confirm this prediction. This methodology provides 
a first step toward modeling the complex interaction of consumer perceptions with respect to GM 
foods and product variety. 
We  also  show  that  the  greatest  percentage  increase  in  consumer  welfare,  and  the  greatest 
percentage loss in market share for GM producers from the introduction of GM labels, occurs when 
consumers have  little interest in product variety and perceive the quality of GM-free products to be 
much better than that of GM products.  
With these results in mind we expect stated willingness to pay for non-GM foods from contingent 
valuation studies to be similar to revealed willingness to pay estimates based on  market data. Clearly, 
the  strength  of  consumer  preferences  for  product  variety  and  the  perceived  quality  of  GM-free 
products  may  differ  across  geographic  and  product  markets.  Stated  preference  analyses  in  these 
markets provide valuable insights into the strength and direction of these preferences and can inform  
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the parameter values used in an empirical application of this model. Thus, the model can be used to 
meld information from stated preference analyses with revealed preference market data to deepen our 
understanding of consumer preferences for quality-differentiated GM products. We also provide an 
argument to suggest that the observed difference in market prices between GM and non-GM food is a 
biased indicator for the willingness to pay for non-GM food, as it includes consumers preferences for 
variety. The model we have presented shows how to adjust the willingness to pay for that bias. 
Finally, the proposed empirical model can be extended to include other components of horizontal 
differentiation, such as packaging size and place of origin. In particular the inclusion of place of origin 
into our model could shed some light on international trade issues related to GM labeling, as well as 
other trade disputes generated by environmental regulations.    
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